On the 26th of September, I was sitting on the Taj sundeck when my Afghan spy partner called to tell me he was inbound to my location. Without pausing, he said something like, “Linda is gone.” He sounded rattled, which was unusual.
“Linda, who?”
“The one who works for DAI.”
There wasn’t a Linda with DAI, but there was with the Idea New project, which DAI funded.
“You mean the Brit, Linda Norgrove”?
“Yes”
“Gone…what do you mean gone”?
“Kidnapped”
“Where”?
“In the Chawkay District, on the road to Abad.”
I emailed Willy 1 and Dewey, explaining that Linda Norgrove was a British national working for the American USAID contractor DAI on the Idea New program. Idea New duplicated our (CADG) technique of rolling around in low-profile, unarmored cars, with singleton international program managers wearing local dress, blending in with the locals as much as possible, etc., but they were unarmed. Like every other international working in Nangarhar province, the British expats working at Idea New came over with the DAI crew every Thursday evening for happy hour. Ski and I listened as one of their program managers explicitly stated that being armed was “ridiculous” (or similar phrasing), but we said nothing. The Brit went on to challenge us on the wisdom of an armed Westerner trying to fight his way out of a Taliban ambush, and we still said nothing. We never thought we could fight off a Taliban ambush on our own, but Linda was not taken in a Taliban ambush. She was kidnapped.
We pored over old UN maps of the district, but none showed the trails or unimproved roads that ran through the Dewagal Valley area where her abandoned two-vehicle convoy was found. We were told the drivers and the two Afghans with her were taken, and there was no spent brass at the scene. My Afghan spymaster started working the phones, focusing on the lower Dewagal Valley. Dewey called later that day on Skype for an update, and we had little other than it looked like she was in the custody of Lowlander Salafis (technically Wahhabists), not the Highlander Korengali. Dewey said that Willy 3 had an asset inbound who knew the area and had access. He then asked if we had a plan.
I suggested that we try to swap me for Linda because kidnapping a woman was considered poor form among the Afghan criminal elements, and I was more capable of humping over the mountain passes into Pakistan. The kidnappers themselves would never go for the idea. But they were being hosted in an unidentified village where the elders might help determine if releasing an infidel female for a male hostage was a better course of action. Afghans love hopelessly romantic heroic deeds, so inserting one of us into the kidnapping chain would bring instant fame among the tribes and some protection. Who wants to be the Afghan who killed a famous and worthy infidel? Dewey dismissed the idea, predicting we wouldn’t be able to reach the target village because ISAF would flood the area with troops. I think he said something like, “Stop with the bullshit hero plans and find the fucking girl…you guys sound like CIA officers with your goddamn swapping out kidnapped victims crap.”
I thought he’d be impressed, but we could not do much to impress Dewey. While trying to find Linda, Dewey worked to get the information we would soon have into the hands of someone who could act on it. As Linda was a British citizen, Dewey started with his contacts in MI6. It turned out the British crisis management team had contracted the British PMC, Edinburgh Risk, to manage this crisis, which was curious, as Edinburgh had no presence in Eastern Afghanistan. We waited for Edinburgh to call the Taj to look for help or rent a few rooms, but we only heard crickets.
As usual, our attempts to get trusted agents into the area where Linda was held were successful. By the 29th of September, Willy 3 had the kidnappers’ names, pictures, their chain of command, and a theory as to why they kidnapped Linda in the first place. The kidnapping crew had been identified the month prior in my order-of-battle reporting, and those reports were added to the target package.
Dewey passed our reporting on to both MI6 and the American DIA. The Brits read everything we wrote, and the Americans ignored everything we sent. As the crisis continued, President Obama persuaded the British Prime Minister to allow the American military to take charge of the case because there were only American units in RC East, and they had the local knowledge to be effective. On the 30th of September, the American military took over the kidnapping case. On the 1st of October, I received a call from the Jalalabad Human Terrain Team asking me to come in to talk with a friend. “About fucking time,” was my curt response.
Thirty minutes later, I was introduced to a DIA agent in the Human Terrain Team office. He looked like every other DIA agent I had ever met, bearded, in his mid-30s, slim, fit, and wary. He took me to a separate office so we could talk alone, and the first question he asked was if I knew Linda Norgrove. I was stunned and looked at him hard to see if he was jerking my chain, but he seemed to have no idea who I was. I then asked a question I hated asking, “Do you know who I am?” He did not and claimed to have never heard of the Eclipse Group, Dewey Clarridge, or a Pentagon private spy ring. It appeared he was telling the truth—not that I cared—so I asked what they had so far, and he gave me the grid coordinate where her car was found. I didn’t believe that for a second, but I didn’t care because I came bearing gifts.
Instead of trying to explain the mountain of information we had on the kidnapping — primarily through Willy 3’s excellent network — we walked down to the Human Terrain Team office, where my friend Kerry Patton lent us his desktop computer. I pulled up the AfPakrp.org website and scrolled to report #825, which was a summation of reports 820, 823, and 824, and cross-referenced report 621a, which was when the Taliban kidnap team leader, Mawlvi Baseer, first popped up on my network. The DIA agent was stunned. Kerry said, “I told you, man. You should have listened to us sooner. These guys are the shit.” I added that a Salafi commander known to us had agreed to send armed men into the upper reaches of the Dewagal Valley to locate the kidnappers, establish proof of life, and be in a position to facilitate negotiations.
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